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Abstract 
 
Using data on Indian banks for 1996-2008, the paper examines the interconnect among credit 
growth, bank soundness and financial fragility. The analysis appears to indicate that higher credit 
growth amplifies bank fragility. Besides, the results point to the fact that sounder banks increase 
loan supply. Coming to bank ownership, the evidence testifies that credit growth has been rapid 
in state-owned and de novo private banks. In terms of policy implications, the analysis appears to 
suggest the need for giving priority to risk-based supervision as a way to contain the potential 
risks associated with rapid credit growth   
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Credit Growth, Bank Soundness and Financial Fragility: 
Evidence from Indian Banking Sector 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Across several emerging economies, credit to the private sector has expanded at a fast 
clip over the pace several years. For example, the BIS (2009) reports that several Latin American 
and transition economies such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Romania, Bulgaria and Estonia 
recorded exceedingly high growth rate of real credit over the past few years. Among Asian 
countries, Indonesia, China and India posted significant credit expansion. This rapid growth in 
credit has been the culmination of a number of factors, including greater corporate leveraging, 
increased capital market access and the introduction of new products and credit risk management 
methodologies, in part triggered by increased foreign bank entry. As well, rapid credit expansion 
has brought important benefits, helping channel savings to households and investors and 
supporting financial sector development and economic growth.  
Yet, this brisk pace of credit expansion has also raised concerns about macroeconomic 
and prudential risks (Bank of England, 2009; BIS, 2010). Quantifying these risks remains a 
challenge, especially since financial soundness indicators tend to improve in the upward phase of 
the credit cycle. Financial sector difficulties cannot be ruled out, for example, loan losses 
following a protracted recession. How significant are these risks and what role should public 
policy play are key questions confronting policymakers.  
The present paper empirically examines this issue, focusing on India as a case study. The 
study weaves together several distinct strands of literature. First, the study contributes to macro-
level studies that examine the potential drivers of credit growth. Second, the article augments 
bank-level studies that focus on the impact of credit growth on bank fragility. Third, the analysis 
recognizes the interplay between bank soundness and fragility, since evidence for developed 
economies appears to indicate that these variables are intertwined (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; 
Kwan and Eisenbis, 1997; Rime, 2001; Stolz, 2008).  As well, the study also draws on recent 
literature emphasizing the role of bank soundness as a factor driving credit growth (Dell’ Ariccia 
et al., 2005, Nier and Zicchino, 2005). Finally, the research adds to the extant literature on capital 
adequacy by examining the role of bank capital in influencing bank loan supply (Kishan and 
Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).  
Three major hypotheses are examined in the analysis. The first is that rapid credit growth 
in India has not weakened banks. The second is that credit growth has been rapid in sounder 
banks. Third, does the capital position of banks impinge on banks’ loan supply. These hypotheses 
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can enable us to understand how significant the prudential risks associated with rapid credit 
growth are and how best to address them.  
The analysis employs a detailed bank-level dataset. The core of the data is the public 
information on bank’s balance sheet including prudential and financial indicators as published by 
the Indian central bank on an annual basis. The dataset allows differences to be identified 
between bank groups (domestic- versus foreign-owned), by way of listing status and by credit 
category (public versus private sector).  
The reminder of the article continues as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature. Section 3 describes the empirical model and the methodology. The variable definitions 
and their expected effect on risk-taking are provided in Section 4, followed by the data (Section 
5) and results (Section 6). The final section concludes.  
 
2. Credit growth of Indian banks 
 The Indian banking system is characterized by a large number of banks with mixed 
ownership1. The commercial banking segment presently comprises 28 state-owned banks in 
which Government has majority ownership of over 51%, 25 private sector (including 8 de novo 
private) banks and 29 foreign banks. Total bank assets constituted a little over 90% of GDP in 
2007-08. Public sector banks had roughly three-quarter share in the assets of the banking system, 
while private and foreign banks constituted the remaining. In 1991, public sector banks share in 
the total assets of the banking system was over 90% (See, Chairlone and Ghosh, 2009 for a recent 
overview of banking reforms in India). 
At the initiation of reforms, credit penetration was low with the share of bank credit in 
GDP averaging less than a quarter during the first few years of reforms. Private sector credit was 
the only sector which recorded positive growth rates of credit. By the next period, in a liberalized 
banking environment, there was a rapid growth in unsecured credit and to a lesser extent, priority 
sector, on the back of lacklustre credit demand from the private sector in a low growth 
environment. De novo private banks became operative during this period and quickly established 
significant footprints in the financial marketplace with their share in bank credit averaging 11 
percent, roughly half of the numbers for old private banks, by the end of the decade.   
As the second generation reforms began taking effect, driven by the recommendations of 
the Government-appointed Committee (Government of India, 1998), the pace of credit growth 
increased sharply, driven primarily by increases in private sector credit and to a lesser extent, 
priority sector credit. The latter followed essentially from a gradual expansion of the list of items 
eligible for inclusion under “priority sector”, which made such lending an increasingly profitable 
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venture. This period also witnessed the beginnings of rapid growth in retail credit, part of which 
was manifest in unsecured credit expansion. For the banking sector as a whole, the growth in 
unsecured credit was 9 percent, being close to double digits for SBI group and new private banks. 
 
Table 1. Credit growth by bank groups 
Bank group 1991-92 
to 
1994-95 
1995-96 
to 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
to 
2002-03 
2003-04 
to 
2007-08 
1995-96 
to 
2007-08 
 Pre sample period Sample period 
  Sub-period 1 Sub-period 2 Sub-period 3 Whole period 
All banks      
   Total credit -0.38 3.43 5.49 9,79 4.99 
   Private sector credit 2.69 2.64 5.05 10.61 5.74 
   Priority sector credit -0.33 4.30 5.53 9.49 5.26 
   Unsecured credit -3.87 6.15 8.52 15.47 6.95 
Bank credit/Total credit 83.6 79.2 81.5 90.8 84.2 
Bank credit/GDP 22.5 20.9 26.5 42.1 28.5 
Nationalized banks      
   Total credit -0.92 3.39 5.01 10.00 4.57 
   Private sector credit 1.00 2.62 3.68 12.01 5.03 
   Priority sector credit -1.46 3.79 5.98 8.70 4.63 
   Unsecured credit -5.58 5.56 9.28 15.05 5.68 
Bank credit/Total credit 74.0 65.8 68.8 82.8 73.5 
Bank credit/GDP 12.6 10.6 13.1 20.4 14.4 
SBI and Associates      
   Total credit -1.65 2.64 3.57 9.03 4.03 
   Private sector credit 3.80 1.92 2.37 11.03 5.48 
   Priority sector credit -1.22 4.25 3.47 9.03 4.45 
   Unsecured credit -4.44 10.39 15.64 14.11 8.74 
Bank credit/Total credit 62.7 53.4 55.0 71.1 61.2 
Bank credit/GDP 7.4 6.3 7.2 10.3 7.9 
Old private banks      
   Total credit 7.12 4.39 3.60 5.53 5.31 
   Private sector credit 10.51 2.06 3.68 5.74 5.43 
   Priority sector credit 7.07 6.53 2.07 6.55 5.88 
   Unsecured credit -2.92 4.46 3.07 8.35 4.71 
Bank credit/Total credit 19.8 21.4 23.2 35.0 25.1 
Bank credit/GDP 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.6 
New private banks      
   Total credit .. 14.77 18.78 12.39 17.20 
   Private sector credit .. 11.84 18.29 9.84 16.03 
   Priority sector credit .. 13.54 19.39 14.24 19.21 
   Unsecured credit .. 11.89 9.35 23.45 16.79 
Bank credit/Total credit 0.7 11.0 28.8 59.6 25.6 
Bank credit/GDP 0.01 0.7 2.4 6.4 2.5 
Foreign banks      
   Total credit 2.83 1.79 3.55 8.89 5.30 
   Private sector credit 1.83 1.61 3.54 7.87 5.07 
   Priority sector credit 17.89 3.37 3.92 11.83 9.13 
   Unsecured credit 0.22 4.42 2.14 14.30 6.73 
Bank credit/Total credit 24.1 25.3 25.9 39.8 29.1 
Bank credit/GDP 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.8 2.0 
Source: Computed from RBI (various years) 
 
The final period witnessed an explosion in credit growth across bank groups, which 
credit-to-GDP ratio averaging 40 percent, double the numbers of previous periods. This rapid 
increase was shared by all bank groups, although new private banks emerged as major players, at 
the cost of old private banks (which witnessed several mergers) and to a lesser extent, state-
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owned (nationalized and SBI group) banks. Available information appears to suggest that India 
was one of the high credit growth countries, with (real) corporate credit growth in excess of 20 
percent during the last three years and (real) household credit growth far outpacing this number 
(BIS, 2009).  
One feature of the credit growth has been the overwhelming share of commercial bank 
credit in total credit. By way of example, the average share of bank credit in total credit by all 
financial entities2 was around 85 percent over the entire period; this largely follows from the 
bank-based nature of the financial system in India (Demirguc Kunt and Levine, 2001; Beck and 
Demirguc Kunt, 2009). After witnessing a modest decline in the late 1990s, it has trended up 
thereafter, reflecting to an extent, the folding up of long-term development banks (with several of 
them converting into banks in the interim) and greater availability of non-deposit funding as also 
the unwinding of excess investments in an era of rapid credit growth. Taken together, these 
financed roughly 35 percent of incremental credit in 2004-05 and over 45 percent in 2005-06.   
 
3. Literature Review 
Several explanations have appeared in the literature to explain fluctuations in credit 
policies of banks. The most common reflection of this phenomenon arises from the fact that 
management compensation structures can generate perverse incentives, which in turn, is an aspect 
of the principal-agent problem. Once managers obtain a reasonable return on equity for their 
shareholders, they may engage in activities that depart from the firm’s value maximization. To 
the extent that managers have limited liability, a manifestation of this possibility could be to 
favour high risk-return strategies (i.e., over extension of credit) in order to increase the social 
presence of the bank managers or the power of managers in an enlarging organization 
(Williamson, 1963).  
Second, strong competition among banks or between banks and other financial 
intermediaries erodes margins and puts pressure on banks’ bottomline. To compensate for 
declining profitability, bank managers might sacrifice objectivity in credit evaluation standards 
and increase loan growth indiscriminately at the expense of the (future) quality of their loan 
portfolios. To the extent that such loans turn out to be non-performing only with a lag, it might 
encourage further loan growth. 
Herd behavior (Rajan 1994) might also help to explain why bank managers finance 
negative NPV projects during expansions. The fact that others are lending may be considered as 
invaluable information concerning the creditworthiness of a potential borrower. And importantly, 
                                              
2 Comprising of regional rural banks, cooperative banks, microfinance institutions (PACS) development banks (at both the state and 
national level) and investment institutions 
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managerial performance is generally judged relative to some market benchmark. The 
disincentives for being wrong in company are generally much less than for being wrong in 
isolation. Managers, as a result, have a strong incentive to behave as their peers, which, at an 
aggregate level, enhances lending booms and recessions. Short-term objectives are prevalent and 
might explain why banks become aggressive to finance projects during expansions , leading to 
rapid loan growth.  
The majority of the studies in this area have primarily dealt with developed markets, such 
as the US banks (Contessi and Francis, 2009), transition (Coricelli and Masten, 2004) and EU 
countries (Collarelli et al, 2005; Egert et al., 2006; Maechler et al, 2007) and to a lesser extent, 
the Latin American (Barajas et al., 2005; Breuer et al., 2009) banking sector. Using quarterly 
(and monthly) data on banks from eight Latin American countries for 1992-2001, Barajas and 
Steiner (2002) finds that the evolution of deposits to be a key factor explaining credit expansion. 
Using data for 1997-2004 on Eastern European economies, Maechler et al (2009) found that 
although loan growth generally had been associated with improvements in bank soundness, over-
extension of credit could weaken bank soundness. These studies generally did not find any 
significant differences in the rate of credit growth for domestic versus foreign banks, but 
confirmed that the latter had a competitive advantage owing to their higher efficiency (de Haas 
and Lelyveld, 2006).   
In the Indian context, studies have examined the existence of credit channel. Employing a 
Vector Auto Regression (VAR) methodology, Pandit et al. (2006) confirm the existence of a bank 
lending channel. Second, the analysis appears to suggest that large banks are able to successfully 
insulate their loan supply from contractionary policy shocks vis-a-vis small banks. Using monthly 
data for 1996-2006, RBI (2006) found that the availability of lendable resources, non-performing 
loans and asset prices to be the major determinants of bank credit expansion. Credit was also 
found to be positively related to output gap, indicative of its pro-cyclical nature. However, these 
studies did not take on board the association of credit growth with bank soundness and between 
bank soundness and financial fragility and this becomes a major concern of the paper.  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
We model credit growth, bank soundness and capital adequacy as functions of each other 
and other bank-specific factors. Credit growth is measure as the annual change in total 
outstanding loans of individual banks, the soundness of banks is measured by their distance to 
default (De Nicolo, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Mercieca et al. 2007; Laeven and Levine, 
2009) and fragility is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. A 
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parsimonious baseline specification was selected by sequentially testing the relevance of various 
factors identified in the recent literature as structural determinants of credit growth, bank 
soundness and financial fragility.  
A starting point for the selection of the baseline specification was to include bank-
specific variables likely to affect bank soundness, bank fragility and the rate at which banks 
expand their loan portfolios. These variables reflect the supply-side determinants of credit 
growth, the importance of which was emphasized by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), Nier and 
Zicchino (2006). In line with recent studies of bank soundness (De Nicolo, 2007; Maechler et al., 
2007), measures of bank profitability (proxied by the net interest margin), liquidity (proxied by 
the liquidity ratio) and efficiency (proxied by cost to income ratio) are included as explanatory 
variables.  We also control for income diversification in the soundness equation: using cross-
country data on 288 banks for 1995-2000, Laeven and Levine (2008) find that well-diversified 
banks are less prone to taking risks. To control for size, we follow Berger et al. (2005) and 
employ both total size (measured as log of total asset) and relative size (measured as lag of share 
of bank assets by total banking assets in a given year). The former controls for scale economies 
and the latter controls for market power. All equations control for bank ownership and include 
year dummies to control for year-specific effects, including business cycle and other banking 
industry-specific considerations.  
 Based on the above discussion, the general specification of the model for bank s at time t 
can be specified as follows: 
Equation 1: Bank credit growth 
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Equation 2: Bank soundness 
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Equation 3: Bank fragility 
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These equations can be estimated using the three stage least squares (3SLS) 
methodology.  
 
5. Data description 
 The time period of the study spans 1996-2008 and comprises of all state-owned banks, 
several (including de novo) private banks, and 11 foreign banks, accounting, on average, for 
around 95% of banking assets. Owing to mergers and acquisitions, primarily in the private 
banking segment, we have a maximum of 62 banks in the beginning of the sample period to a low 
of 56 banks in the terminal year of the sample. The data for the analysis are extracted from 
published sources. With a total of 62 banks spanning across 13 years, we have a maximum of 806 
bank-years.  
Table 2. Summary statistics – Major variables  
Variable Empirical definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Devn 
Correlation (p-Value) 
Dependent     Loan growth Z-score NPL 
Loan growth Log of first difference of bank loans 793 -0.077 0.516 1.00   
Z-score (π/A+E/A)/σ (π/A), where π is net profit, E is equity, A is 
total asset and σ denotes standard deviation 
794 18.677 18.632 -0.012 (0.73) 1.00  
NPL Non-performing loans/ Total loans 806 0.085 0.068 0.208 (0.00) -0.077 (0.03) 1.00 
Independent        
CIR Cost income ratio = Operating expense/(Total income  
minus interest expense) 
797 0.555 0.183 0.039 (0.27) -0.184 (0.00) 0.577 (0.00) 
NIM (Interest income minus interest expense)/ Total asset 797 0.029 0.028 0.016 (0.65) 0.021 (0.54) -0.112 (0.00) 
Liquidity Liquid assets/Total assets, where Liquid assets = cash in 
hand + balances with central bank + call money  
797 0.125 0.085 -0.052 (0.14) 0.019 (0.59) 0.082 (0.02) 
Diversification Measure of income diversification, based on Laeven-Levine 
(2007) and is calculated as: 
|int(|1
incomeoperatingTotal
incomeoperatingotherincomeerestnet −−  
where net interest income equals interest income minus 
interest expense and other operating income equals net fee 
income, net commission income and net trading income. 
Total operating income is the aggregate of net interest 
income and other operating income 
794 0.767 0.195 -0.055 (0.14) 0.019 (0.00) 0.063 (0.07) 
Branch growth Log of first difference of bank branch 795 0.035 0.169 0.062 (0.07) 0.011 (0.76) -0.144 (0.00) 
Size Log (total asset) 797 4.029 0.626 -0.218 (0.00) 0.219 (0.00) -0.104 (0.00) 
Relative size Total asset of bank s in year t/Total banking sector assets in 
year t 
797 0.016 0.030 -0.014 (0.69) 0.191 (0.00) 0.098 (0.00) 
SOB Dummy=1, if a bank is state-owned, else zero 793 0.456 0.498 -0.029 (0.42) 0.116 (0.00) 0.254 (0.00) 
NPB Dummy=1, if a bank is new private, else zero 793 0.098 0.298 0.039 (0.27) 0.084 (0.01) -0.186 (0.00) 
OPB Dummy=1, if a bank is old private, else zero 793 0.271 0.445 -0.003 (0.93) -0.049 (0.16) 0.059 (0.09) 
FORGN Dummy=1, if a bank is foreign, else zero 793 0.174 0.379 0.010 (0.77) -0.162 (0.00) -0.257 (0.00) 
MERGER Dummy=1, for the acquiring bank in the year of merger, 
else zero 
793 0.024 0.153 -0.108 (0.00) -0.017 (0.63) -0.096 (0.00) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
9
6. Findings and discussion 
This section details the findings of the regression analysis. We discuss the results under 
three heads: first, we examine the baseline regression, including robustness checks. Second, we 
explore which of the components of credit have been instrumental in driving the credit expansion. 
And third, we focus on state-owned banks (SOBs), which account for nearly three-quarter of the 
banking system assts. We estimate the general specification of the model for the whole period as 
also for the sub-period 2004-08, which coincided with a rapid expansion in credit in the banking 
sector.  
 
6.1 Discussion of the baseline regression 
Across all equation, higher bank efficiency, as measured by the cost-to-income ratio, 
exerts a perceptible influence on the dependent variable. On the one hand higher levels of bank 
inefficiency dampens credit growth and lowers bank soundness, on the other, it exacerbates bank 
fragility. This is consistent with studies which predict that inefficient banks tend to be more risky 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Hao et al., 1999; Maudos and Pastor, 
2001; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003; Das and Ghosh, 2006; Das and Ghosh, 2009). The evidence 
indicates that banks with greater market power exhibit lower loan growth.  
   
  Table 3. 3 SLS estimation of credit growth, bank soundness and bank fragility 
Variable Period: 1996-2008 Period: 2004-2008 
 Credit growth Bank soundness Bank fragility Credit growth Bank soundness Bank fragility 
Credit growth 0.195 (0.035)*** -0.073 (0.057) 0.044 (0.012)*** 0.181 (0.069)*** -0.560 (1.306) 0.042 (0.019)*** 
Bank soundness 0.017 (0.015) 0.769 (0.248)*** 0.0004 (0.005) 0.012 (0.020) 0.653 (0.387)*** -0.0005 (0.005) 
Bank fragility  -0.074 (0.066) 0.624 (1.085) 0.691 (0.023)*** -0.095 (0.156) -0.082 (0.296) 0.609 (0.043)*** 
Bank-level controls       
CIR -0.049 
(0.021)*** 
-0.924 (0.348)*** 0.030 (0.007)*** -0.064 (0.038)* -0.153 (0.073)** 0.026 (0.010)*** 
NIM 0.543 (0.353) -0.498 (0.587) -0.318 
(0.123)*** 
1.510 (0.671)** 0.132 (0.131) -0.105 (0.184) 
Liquidity 0.047 (0.048) 0.348 (0.787) -0.043 
(0.017)*** 
0.111 (0.067)* 0.055 (0.128) -0.026 (0.018) 
Size 0.006 (0.008) 0.126 (0.149) -0.0006 (0.003) -0.007 (0.017) -0.056 (0.315) 0.0005 (0.005) 
Relative size -0.202 (0.122)* 0.212 (0.199) 0.020 (0.043) -0.102 (0.236) 0.592 (0.448) 0.018 (0.065) 
Income diversification  0.428 (0.258)*   -0.603 (0.445)  
Bank branch growth   -0.004 (0.006)   0.009 (0.016) 
Dummy variables       
SOB 0.019 (0.009)** -0.226 (1.516) -0.007 (0.003)** 0.038 (0.015)*** -0.182 (0.291) -0.005 (0.004) 
NPB 0.058 (0.011)*** 0.183 (0.186) -0.007 (0.004)* 0.066 (0.019)*** 0.114 (0.370) -0.007 (0.005) 
FORGN -0.011 (0.009) -0.237 (0.151) -0.010 
(0.003)*** 
0.013 (0.015) -0.167 (0.298) -0.012 (0.010) 
MERGER 0.045 (0.018)*** 0.052 (0.292) 0.003 (0.006) 0.036 (0.023)* 0.044 (0.430) -0.0007 (0.007) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostics       
Observations 721 721 721 289 289 289 
R-squared 0.981 0.629 0.849 0.990 0.564 0.681 
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively  
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The analysis also supports the existence of persistence effects: the lagged dependent 
variable across all three specifications is significant at conventional levels. Among the cross-
equation relationships, the analysis indicates that higher credit growth exerts tends to amplify 
bank fragility. This concurs with the literature that suggests that rapid credit growth could be a 
harbinger of financial instability (Fernandez et al., 2000; Borio et al. 2001; Hilbers et al. 2005; 
Cottarelli et al. 2005; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006;). Besides the economic significance, the 
magnitude is statistically important, as well: a one standard deviation rise in credit growth lowers 
bank fragility by 0.33 standard deviation. These magnitudes are consistent with previous 
literature on Indian state-owned banks which posits a dampening effect of rapid credit  expansion 
on bank soundness (Das and Ghosh, 2007). 
Coming to bank ownership, the evidence clearly suggests that credit growth has been 
rapid in state-owned and de novo private banks with respect to the control category. As well, all 
three bank groups appear to be less fragile in terms of their non-performing loan ratio as 
compared to others.  
Since all equations control for the impact of merger and address demand-side 
considerations by including year fixed effects, it seems less likely that these results are driven by 
business cycle or other bank-specific effects.  
We also estimate the equation system for a much shorter period from 2004-2008, 
coinciding with the period of significant credit expansion (See, Table1). The results appear to 
reinforce previous findings: credit growth appears to exert a positive impact on bank fragility. 
Across ownership, it seems that only the fragility of foreign banks is lower as compared to others; 
the remaining findings are the same as earlier. 
 
6.2 Which components of credit are most relevant in explaining the relationship? 
We next examine which components of credit are the most relevant in enplaning the 
relationship. For expositional simplicity, we examine three categories of credit - according to 
sector, type and security – and consider within each of these sub-categories, the most dominant 
component of that category.  
For instance, in terms of sectoral distribution of credit, we focus on private sector credit. 
Within the other two categories similarly, we consider growth in term lending and growth in 
unsecured loans, respectively. Since the control variables are unaltered in sign and significance, 
we present the findings only with respect to the endogenous variables. Table 4 presents some 
details. 
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The findings in Panel A suggests that sounder banks experience higher growth in private 
sector credit – the coefficient on bank soundness is positive and significant at conventional levels. 
In terms of magnitude, a 1 percentage point rise in bank capital translates into a credit expansion 
by the private sector of nearly 0.3 percentage point. When we consider the revised sample period, 
these relationship between private sector credit growth and bank soundness is found to be 
mutually reinforcing: while higher levels of bank soundness exerts a salutary impact on private 
sector credit growth on the one hand, on the other, high growth in private sector credit is found to 
augment bank soundness, perhaps through its impact on bank profitability.3 In addition, bank 
fragility and credit growth are found to be negatively related. Thus, while high growth in private 
credit can lead to an improvement in bank soundness, it could also engender higher fragilities, for 
example, through higher loan delinquencies.   
Table 4. 3 SLS estimation of credit growth, bank soundness and bank fragility –  
Analyzing credit components 
Variable Period: 1996-2008 Period: 2004-2008 
Panel A Credit component according to sector 
 Pvt. sector  
credit growth 
Bank soundness Bank fragility Pvt. sector  
credit growth 
Bank soundness Bank fragility 
Pvt. sector credit growth 0.054 (0.033)* -0.018 (0.012) 0.115 (0.123) 0.067 (0.064) 0.057 (0.029)** 0.639 (0.351)* 
Bank soundness 0.304 (0.080)*** 0.590 (0.029)*** -0.697 (0.301)** 0.329 (0.116)** 0.606 (0.055)*** -1.089 (0.624)* 
Bank fragility  0.011 (0.012) 0.005 (0.004) 0.355 (0.044)*** 0.012 (0.015) 0.005 (0.007) 0.392 (0.081)*** 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables       
SOB 0.019 (0.012)* 0.010 (0.004)*** -0.116 (0.042)*** 0.044 (0.017)*** 0.019 (0.008)*** -0.225 (0.096)*** 
NPB 0.064 (0.014)*** -0.003 (0.005) 0.032 (0.051) 0.064 (0.021)*** 0.017 (0.010)* -0.087 (0.119) 
FORGN -0.011 (0.012) 0.005 (0.004) 0.159 (0.042)*** -0.009 (0.018) 0.013 (0.008) 0.183 (0.097)* 
MERGER 0.030 (0.022) -0.001 (0.008) 0.004 (0.079) 0.022 (0.026) 0.0005 (0.012) -0.045 (0.141) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostics       
Observations 710 710 710 293 293 293 
R-squared 0.969 0.525 0.341 0.987 0.482 0.311 
 Growth in  
term lending 
Bank soundness Bank fragility Growth in  
term lending 
Bank soundness Bank fragility 
Panel B Credit component according to type 
Growth in term lending 0.111 (0.024)*** -0.002 (0.006) 0.057 (0.056) 0.227 (0.056)*** 0.057 (0.018)*** 0.545 (0.216)*** 
Bank soundness 0.048 (0.129) 0.648 (0.030)*** -0.647 (0.300)** 0.364 (0.161)** 0.618 (0.053)*** -1.203 (0.621)** 
Bank fragility  0.014 (0.019) 0.005 (0.004) 0.352 (0.043)*** 0.012 (0.021) 0.005 (0.007) 0.392 (0.079)*** 
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables       
SOB 0.021 (0.018) 0.009 (0.004)** -0.117 (0.041)*** 0.038 (0.025) 0.018 (0.008)** -0.214 (0.095)*** 
NPB 0.073 (0.021)*** -0.002 (0.005) 0.032 (0.050) 0.058 (0.029)** 0.015 (0.010) -0.073 (0.118) 
FORGN -0.041 (0.017)*** 0.003 (0.004) 0.156 (0.040)*** -0.027 (0.025) 0.014 (0.008)* 0.173 (0.097)* 
MERGER 0.052 (0.034) -0.003 (0.008) 0.002 (0.078) 0.037 (0.036) 0.0004 (0.011) -0.043 (0.139) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostics       
Observations 724 724 724 293 293 293 
R-squared 0.969 0.525 0.341 0.976 0.493 0.319 
 Growth in  
unsecured loans 
Bank soundness Bank fragility Growth in  
unsecured loans 
Bank soundness Bank fragility 
Panel C Credit component according to security 
Growth in  
unsecured loans 
-0.214 (0.032)*** 0.005 (0.004) 0.043 (0.049) -0.114 (0.057)*** 0.0001 (0.015) 0.218 (0.179) 
Bank soundness 0.537 (0.188)*** 0.597 (0.029)*** -0.671 (0.291)** 0.188 (0.199) 0.610 (0.054)*** -1.114 (0.625)* 
Bank fragility  -0.016 (0.029) 0.005 (0.004) 0.354 (0.045)*** -0.025 (0.026) 0.005 (0.006) 0.406 (0.081)*** 
                                              
3 In terms of Section 25 of the RBI Act, every bank is required to transfer to its reserves not less than 25 percent of its disclosed 
profits, every year.  
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Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy variables       
SOB 0.020 (0.028) 0.008 (0.004)** -0.117 (0.040)*** 0.047 (0.031) 0.019 (0.008)*** -0.232 (0.096)*** 
NPB 0.095 (0.032)*** -0.005 (0.005) 0.026 (0.049) 0.119 (0.037)*** 0.019 (0.010)* -0.124 (0.121) 
FORGN -0.019 (0.027) 0.003 (0.004) 0.161 (0.040)*** 0.046 (0.031) 0.012 (0.008) 0.184 (0.098)* 
MERGER -0.043 (0.053) -0.002 (0.008) 0.005 (0.079) -0.015 (0.045) -0.0004 (0.012) -0.042 (0.141) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostics       
Observations 725 725 725 293 293 293 
R-squared 0.855 0.528 0.346 0.963 0.476 0.308 
Standard errors within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
Panel B focuses on term lending. The results mirror previous findings: loan supply is 
higher for banks with stronger balance sheets, as measured by their CAR. The sub-period findings 
also echo earlier results.   
An examination of growth in unsecured credit partially supports the aforesaid findings 
(Panel C). More specifically, bank soundness leads to a growth in unsecured credit, however, the 
mutually reinforcing relation between credit and capital, as observed for the previous credit 
categories is not in evidence.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 Using data on Indian banks for 1996-2008, the paper examines the nexus among credit 
growth, bank soundness and bank fragility. Alternate measures of soundness and fragility have 
been employed to ascertain robustness. The analysis appears to indicate that higher credit growth 
amplifies bank fragility. Besides, the results point to the fact that sounder banks increase loan 
supply. Overall, this would suggest that prudential risks associated with rapid credit growth are 
well-contained. Coming to bank ownership, the evidence testifies that credit growth has been 
rapid in state-owned and de novo private banks.   
Robustness tests focusing on a shorter time span or various components of credit 
classified according to sector, type and security veer around to broadly similar conclusions: 
sounder banks increase credit supply more than weaker banks and that, the relationship between 
credit risk and bank soundness is mutually reinforcing. In regard to state-owned banks, the results 
indicate that are no significant differences in the credit behaviour of fully government-owned 
versus partially government-owned banks.   
The results motivate a few policy conclusions. First, it seems important to closely 
supervise rapidly growing banks to ensure that these banks have adequate risk management 
systems in place and are pricing risk properly, in conjunction with strengthening prudential 
guidance for banks. Second, a better understanding of the implications of rapid credit growth for 
financial stability in the context of financial sector surveillance seems warranted. Across 
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continents and countries, the evidence indicates that over-extension of credit is often a recipe for 
potential disaster. Over-stretched financial systems and “search for yields” has been found to lead 
to riskier banking systems, leading commentators to seek for imposition of “speed limits” 
(Honohan, 1997), either on their loan book or on segments that appear in danger of over-
extension. In the Indian case, for example, in response to perceptible change in credit expansion, 
the risk weight on certain credit categories and exposures were temporarily increased. Third, in 
the context of the envisaged Basel II, designing an effective prudential policy response to rapid 
credit growth seems a challenging task. On the one hand, while overtly intrusive measures could 
penalize rapidly expanding banks where the risks are well managed and thereby hinder financial 
deepening, on the other, leaving the aspect unattended could lead to a build-up of risks, imposing 
costs on the financial system in future. Judged thus, the above considerations suggest the need for 
giving priority to risk-based supervision coupled with stress testing as a way to contain the 
potential risks associated with rapid credit growth.   
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